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Abstract
After carrying out a protocol for quantum key agreement over a noisy
quantum channel, the parties Alice and Bob must process the raw key
in order to end up with identical keys about which the adversary has
virtually no information. In principle, both classical and quantum pro-
tocols can be used for this processing. It is a natural question which
type of protocols is more powerful. We show that in many cases, for
instance when the 4-state or the 6-state protocol is used, the limits
of tolerable noise are identical for classical and quantum protocols.
More precisely, we prove for general states but under the assumption
of incoherent eavesdropping that Alice and Bob share some so-called
intrinsic information in their classical random variables, resulting from
optimal measurements, if and only if the parties’ quantum systems are
entangled. In addition, we provide evidence which strongly suggests
that the potentials of classical and of quantum protocols are equal in
every situation. It is an important consequence of these parallels that
many techniques and results from quantum information theory directly
apply to problems in classical information theory, and vice versa. For
instance, it was previously believed that two parties can carry out un-
conditionally secure key agreement as long as they share some intrinsic
information in the adversary’s view. The analysis of this purely classi-
cal problem from the quantum information-theoretic viewpoint shows
that this is true in the binary case, but false in general. More explicitly,
bound entanglement, i.e., entanglement that cannot be purified by any
quantum protocol, has a classical counterpart. This “bound intrinsic
information” cannot be distilled to a secret key by any classical pro-
tocol. As another application we propose a measure for entanglement
based on classical information-theoretic quantities.
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1 Introduction
In modern cryptography there are mainly two security paradigms, namely
computational and information-theoretic security. The latter is sometimes
also called unconditional security. Computational security is based on the as-
sumed hardness of certain computational problems (e.g., the integer-factoring
or discrete-logarithm problems). However, since a computationally suf-
ficiently powerful adversary can solve any computational problem, hence
break any such system, and because no useful general lower bounds are
known in complexity theory, computational security is always conditional
and, in addition to this, in danger by progress in the theory of efficient
algorithms as well as in hardware engineering (e.g., quantum computing).
Information-theoretic security on the other hand is based on probability
theory and on the fact that an adversary’s information is limited. Such a
limitation can for instance come from noise in communication channels or
from the laws of quantum mechanics.
Many different settings in the classical noisy-channel model have been
described and analyzed, such as Wyner’s wire-tap channel [29], Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner’s broadcast channel [7], or Maurer’s key agreement from joint ran-
domness [20], [22].
Quantum cryptography on the other hand lies in the intersection of two
of the major scientific achievements of the 20th century, namely quantum
physics and information theory. Various protocols for so-called quantum
key agreement have been proposed (e.g., [3], [10]), and the possibility and
impossibility of purification in different settings has been studied by many
authors.
The goal of this paper is to derive parallels between classical and quan-
tum key agreement and thus to show that the two paradigms are more
closely related than previously recognized. These connections allow for in-
vestigating questions and solving open problems of purely classical infor-
mation theory with quantum-mechanic methods. One of the consequences
is that, in contrast to what was previously believed, there exists a classical
counterpart to so-called bound entanglement (i.e., entanglement that cannot
be purified by any quantum protocol), namely intrinsic information shared
by Alice and Bob which they cannot use for generating a secret key by any
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classical protocol.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
classical (Section 2.1) and quantum (Section 2.2) models of information-
theoretic key agreement and the crucial concepts and quantities, such as
secret-key rate and intrinsic information on one side, and measurements,
entanglement, and quantum privacy amplification on the other. In Sec-
tion 3, we show the mentioned links between these two models, more pre-
cisely, between entanglement and intrinsic information (Section 3.1) as well
as between quantum purification and the secret-key rate (Section 3.4). We
illustrate the statements and their consequences with a number of exam-
ples (Sections 3.2 and 3.5 and Appendix B). In Section 3.6 we define and
characterize the classical counterpart of bound entanglement, called bound
intrinsic information. Finally we show that not only problems in classical
information theory can be addressed by quantum-mechanical methods, but
that the inverse is also true: In Section 3.3 we propose a new measure for
entanglement based on the intrinsic information measure.
2 Models of Information-Theoretically Secure Key
Agreement
2.1 Key Agreement from Classical Information: Intrinsic In-
formation and Secret-Key Rate
In this section we describe Maurer’s general model of classical key agreement
by public discussion from common information [20]. In this setting, two
parties Alice and Bob who are willing to generate a secret key have access
to repeated independent realizations of (classical) random variables X and
Y , respectively, whereas an adversary Eve learns the outcomes of a random
variable Z. Let PXY Z be the joint distribution of the three random variables.
In addition, Alice and Bob are connected by a noiseless and authentic but
otherwise completely insecure channel (see Figure 1 in Appendix A). In this
situation, the secret-key rate S(X;Y ||Z) has been defined as the maximal
rate at which Alice and Bob can generate a secret key that is equal for Alice
and Bob with overwhelming probability and about which Eve has only a
negligible amount of (Shannon) information. For a detailed discussion of
the general scenario and the secret-key rate as well as for various bounds on
S(X;Y ||Z), see [20], [21], [22].
Bound (1) implies that if Bob’s random variable Y provides more in-
formation about Alice’s X than Eve’s Z does (or vice versa), then this
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advantage can be exploited for generating a secret key:
S(X;Y ||Z) ≥ max {I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) , I(Y ;X)− I(Y ;Z)} . (1)
This is a consequence of a result by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [7]. It is somewhat
surprising that this bound is not tight, in particular, that secret-key agree-
ment can even be possible when the right-hand side of (1) vanishes or is
negative. However, the positivity of the expression on the right-hand side
of (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of secret-
key agreement by one-way communication: whenever Alice and Bob start
in a disadvantageous situation with respect to Eve, feedback is necessary.
The corresponding initial phase of the key-agreement protocol is then often
called advantage distillation.
The following upper bound on S(X;Y ||Z) is a generalization of Shan-
non’s well-known impracticality theorem [28] and quantifies the intuitive
fact that no information-theoretically secure key agreement is possible when
Bob’s information is independent from Alice’s random variable, given Eve’s
information: S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ I(X;Y |Z). However, this bound is not tight.
Because it is a possible strategy of the adversary Eve to process Z, i.e., to
send Z over some channel characterized by PZ|Z , we have for such a new
random variable Z that S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ I(X;Y |Z), and hence
S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ min P
Z|Z
{I(X;Y |Z)} =: I(X;Y ↓Z) (2)
holds. The quantity I(X;Y ↓ Z) has been called the intrinsic conditional
information between X and Y given Z [22]. It was conjectured, and evidence
supporting this belief was given, that S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 holds if I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0
does [22]. Some of the results below strongly suggest that this is true if one of
the random variables X and Y is binary and the other one at most ternary,
but false in general.
2.2 Quantum Key Agreement: Measurements, Entanglement,
Purification
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic quantum-theoretic
concepts and notations. For an introduction, see for example [24].
In the context of quantum key agreement, the classical scenario PXY Z
is replaced by a quantum state vector Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE1, where HA,
1We consider pure states, since it is natural to assume that Eve controls all the envi-
ronment outside Alice and Bob’s systems.
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HB , and HE are Hilbert spaces describing the systems in Alice’s, Bob’s,
and Eve’s hands, respectively. Then, measuring this quantum state by the
three parties leads to a classical probability distribution. In the following,
we assume that Eve is free to carry out so-called generalized measurements
(POVMs) [24]. In other words, the set {|z〉} will not be assumed to be
an orthonormal basis, but any set generating the Hilbert space HE and
satisfying the condition
∑
z |z〉〈z| = 1HE . Then, if the three parties carry
out measurements in certain bases2 {|x〉} and {|y〉}, and in the set {|z〉},
respectively, they end up with the classical scenario PXY Z = |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2.
Since this distribution depends on the chosen bases and set, a given quantum
state Ψ does not uniquely determine a classical scenario: some measurements
may lead to scenarios useful for Alice and Bob, whereas for Eve, some others
may (see Appendix B).
The analog of Alice and Bob’s marginal distribution PXY is the partial
state ρAB, obtained by tracing over Eve’s Hilbert space HE. More precisely,
let Ψ =
∑
xyz cxyz|x, y, z〉, where |x, y, z〉 is short for |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 ⊗ |z〉. We can
write Ψ =
∑
z
√
PZ(z)ψz ⊗ |z〉, where PZ denotes Eve’s marginal distribu-
tion of PXY Z . Then ρAB = TrHE (PΨ) :=
∑
z PZ(z)Pψz , where Pψz is the
projector to the state vector ψz.
An important property is that ρAB is pure (ρ
2
AB = ρAB) if and only if
the global state Ψ factorizes, i.e., Ψ = ψAB ⊗ ψE , where ψAB ∈ HA ⊗ HB
and ψE ∈ HE. In this case Alice and Bob are independent of Eve: Eve
cannot obtain any information on Alice’s and Bob’s states by measuring her
system.
After a measurement, Alice and Bob obtain a classical distribution PXY .
However, in order to obtain a well-defined classical scenario one has to as-
sume that also Eve performs a measurement, i.e., that Eve treats her in-
formation on the classical level. Indeed, only then a classical distribution
PXY Z is defined. But considering that in practice all PXY Z result from some
physical process, the assumption that Eve performs the measurement one
would like her to perform is not founded on basic principles3. For example,
Eve’s measurement could be done later and depend on the public discussion
between Alice and Bob. Consequently, the common approach which starts
from PXY Z to prove the security of a key agreement protocol hides an as-
sumption about Eve’s measurement. As we shall see, avoiding this hidden
2We assume all bases to be orthonormal.
3One could argue that if the system in Eve’s hand is classical, then she has no choice for
her measurement. But ultimately all systems are quantum mechanical and the apparent
lack of choice might purely be a matter of technology.
5
assumption and staying in the quantum regime can actually simplify the
analysis of the scenario.
When Alice and Bob share many independent systems4 ρAB, there are
basically two possibilities for generating a secret key. Either they first mea-
sure their systems and then run a classical protocol (process classical infor-
mation) secure against all measurements Eve could possibly perform (i.e.,
against all possible distributions PXY Z that can result after Eve’s measure-
ment). Or they first run a quantum protocol (i.e., process the information
in the quantum domain) and then perform their measurements. The idea
of quantum protocols is to process the systems in state ρAB and to produce
fewer systems in a pure state (i.e., to purify ρAB), thus to eliminate Eve from
the scenario. Moreover, the pure state Alice and Bob end up with should
be maximally entangled (i.e., even for some different and incompatible mea-
surements, Alice’s and Bob’s results are perfectly correlated). Finally, Alice
and Bob measure their maximally entangled systems and establish a secret
key. This way of obtaining a key directly from a quantum state Ψ, without
any error correction nor classical privacy amplification, is called quantum
privacy amplification5 (QPA for short) [8], [2]. Note that the procedure
described in [8] and [2] guarantees that Eve’s relative information (relative
to the key length) is arbitrarily small, but not that her absolute information
is negligible. The analog of this problem in the classical case is discussed
in [21].
The precise conditions under which a general state ρAB can be purified
are not known. However, the two following conditions are necessary. First,
the state must be entangled or, equivalently, not separable. A state ρAB is
separable if and only if it can be written as a mixture of product states, i.e.,
ρAB =
∑
j pjρAj⊗ρBj . Separable states can be generated by purely classical
communication, hence it follows from bound (2) that entanglement is a
necessary condition. The second condition is more subtle: The matrix ρtAB
obtained from ρAB by partial transposition must have at least one negative
eigenvalue [17], [16]. The partial transposition of the density matrix ρAB
is defined as (ρAB)
t
i,j;µ,ν := (ρAB)i,ν;µ,j, where the indices i and µ [j and ν]
run through a basis of HA [HB ]. Note that this definition is base-dependent.
However, the eigenvalues of ρtAB are not [25]. The second of these conditions
4Here we do not consider the possibility that Eve coherently processes several of her
systems. This corresponds to the assumption in the classical scenario that repeated real-
izations of X, Y , and Z are independent of each other.
5 The term “quantum privacy amplification” is somewhat unfortunate since it does not
correspond to classical privacy amplification, but includes advantage distillation and error
correction.
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implies the first one: negative (i.e., at least one eigenvalue is negative) partial
transposition implies entanglement.
In the binary case (HA and HB both have dimension two), the above two
conditions are equivalent and sufficient for the possibility of quantum key
agreement: all entangled binary states can be purified. The same even holds
if one Hilbert space is of dimension 2 and the other one of dimension 3. How-
ever, for larger dimensions there are examples showing that these conditions
are not equivalent: There are entangled states whose partial transpose has
no negative eigenvalue, hence cannot be purified [17]. Such states are called
bound entangled, in contrast to free entangled states, which can be purified.
Moreover, it is believed that there even exist entangled states which cannot
be purified although they have negative partial transposition [9].
3 Linking Classical and Quantum Key Agreement
In this section we derive a close connection between the possibilities offered
by classical and quantum protocols for key agreement. The intuition is as
follows. As described in Section 2.2, there is a very natural connection
between quantum states Ψ and classical distributions PXY Z which can be
thought of as arising from Ψ by measuring in a certain basis, e.g., the stan-
dard basis6. (Note however that the connection is not unique even for fixed
bases: For a given distribution PXY Z , there are many states Ψ leading to
PXY Z by carrying out measurements.) When given a state Ψ between three
parties Alice, Bob, and Eve, and if ρAB denotes the resulting mixed state
after tracing out Eve, then the corresponding classical distribution PXY Z
has positive intrinsic information if and only if ρAB is entangled. However,
this correspondence clearly depends on the measurement bases used by Al-
ice, Bob, and Eve. If for instance ρAB is entangled, but Alice and Bob
do very unclever measurements, then the intrinsic information may vanish
(see Example 7 in Appendix B). If on the other hand ρAB is separable,
Eve may do such bad measurements that the intrinsic information becomes
positive, despite the fact that ρAB could have been established by public
discussion without any prior correlation (see Example 6 in Appendix B).
Consequently, the correspondence between intrinsic information and entan-
6A priori, there is no privileged basis. However, physicists often write states like ρAB in
a basis which seems to be more natural than others. We refer to this as the standard basis.
Somewhat surprisingly, this basis is generally easy to identify, though not precisely defined.
One could characterize the standard basis as the basis for which as many coefficients as
possible of Ψ are real and positive. We usually represent quantum states with respect to
the standard basis.
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glement must involve some optimization over all possible measurements on
all sides.
A similar correspondence on the protocol level is supported by many
examples, but not rigorously proven: The distribution PXY Z allows for clas-
sical key agreement if and only if quantum key agreement is possible starting
from the state ρAB.
We show how these parallels allow for addressing problems of purely clas-
sical information-theoretic nature with the methods of quantum information
theory, and vice versa.
3.1 Entanglement and Intrinsic Information
Let us first establish the connection between intrinsic information and en-
tanglement. Theorem 1 states that if ρAB is separable, then Eve can “force”
the information between Alice’s and Bob’s classical random variables (given
Eve’s classical random variable) to be zero (whatever strategy Alice and Bob
use). In particular, Eve can prevent classical key agreement.
Theorem 1 Let Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE and ρAB = TrHE (PΨ). If ρAB is
separable, then there exists a generating set {|z〉} of HE such that for all
bases {|x〉} and {|y〉} of HA and HB, respectively, I(X;Y |Z) = 0 holds for
PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2.
Proof. If ρAB is separable, then there exist vectors |αz〉 and |βz〉 such that
ρAB =
∑nz
z=1 pzPαz ⊗Pβz , where Pαz denotes the one-dimensional projector
onto the subspace spanned by |αz〉.
Let us first assume that nz ≤ dimHE . Then there exists a basis {|z〉}
of HE such that Ψ =
∑
z
√
pz |αz, βz , z〉 holds [23], [12], [19].
If nz > dimHE, then Eve can add an auxiliary system Haux to hers
(usually called an ancilla) and we have Ψ⊗|γ0〉 =
∑
z
√
pz |αz, βz , γz〉, where
|γ0〉 ∈ Haux is the state of Eve’s auxiliary system, and {|γz〉} is a basis of
HE ⊗Haux. We define the (not necessarily orthonormalized) vectors |z〉 by
|z, γ0〉 = 1HE⊗Pγ0 |γz〉. These vectors determine a generalized measurement
with positive operators Oz = |z〉〈z|. Since
∑
z Oz⊗Pγ0 =
∑
z |z, γ0〉〈z, γ0| =∑
z 1HE ⊗Pγ0 |γz〉〈|γz |1HE ⊗Pγ0 = 1HE ⊗Pγ0 , the Oz satisfy
∑
z Oz = 1HE ,
as they should in order to define a generalized measurement [24]. Note that
the first case (nz ≤ dimHE) is a special case of the second one, with |γz〉 =
|z, γ0〉. If Eve now performs the measurement, then we have PXY Z(x, y, z) =
|〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2 = |〈x, y, γz |Ψ, γ0〉|2, and
PXY |Z(x, y, z) = |〈x, y|αz , βz〉|2 = |〈x|αz〉|2 |〈y|βz〉|2 = PX|Z(x, z)PY |Z(y, z)
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holds for all |z〉 and for all |x, y〉 ∈ HA⊗HB. Consequently, I(X;Y |Z) = 0.
✷
Theorem 2 states that if ρAB is entangled, then Eve cannot force the
intrinsic information to be zero: Whatever she does (i.e., whatever general-
ized measurements she carries out), there is something Alice and Bob can
do such that the intrinsic information is positive. Note that this does not,
a priori, imply that secret-key agreement is possible in every case. Indeed,
we will provide evidence for the fact that this implication does generally not
hold.
Theorem 2 Let Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE and ρAB = TrHE (PΨ). If ρAB is
entangled, then for all generating sets {|z〉} of HE , there are bases {|x〉}
and {|y〉} of HA and HB, respectively, such that I(X;Y ↓ Z) > 0 holds for
PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that there exists a generating
set {|z〉} of HE such that for all bases {|x〉} of HA and {|y〉} of HB, I(X;Y ↓
Z) = 0 holds for the resulting distribution. For such a distribution, there
exists a channel, characterized by PZ|Z , such that I(X;Y |Z) = 0 holds, i.e.,
PXY |Z(x, y, z) = PX|Z(x, z)PY |Z(y, z) . (3)
Let now ρz := (1/pz)
∑
z pzPZ|Z(z, z)Pψz with pz = PZ(z) and pz =
∑
z PZ|Z(z, z)pz,
and where ψz is the state of Alice’s and Bob’s system conditioned on Eve’s
result z: Ψ⊗ |γ0〉 =
∑
z ψz ⊗ |γz〉 (see the proof of Theorem 1).
From (3) we can conclude Tr(Px ⊗ Pyρz) = Tr(Px ⊗ 1ρz¯)Tr(1 ⊗ Pyρz)
for all one-dimensional projectors Px and Py acting in HA and HB, respec-
tively. Consequently, the states ρz are products, i.e., ρz = ραz ⊗ ρβz , and
ρAB =
∑
z¯ pz¯ρz¯ is separable. ✷
Theorem 2 can be formulated in a more positive way. Let us first intro-
duce the concept of a set of bases {|xj〉, |yj〉}, where the j label the different
bases, as they are used in the 4-state (2 bases) and the 6-state (3 bases) pro-
tocols [3], [4], [1]. Then if ρAB is entangled there exists a set {|xj〉, |yj〉} ofN
bases such that for all generalized measurements {|z〉}, I(X;Y ↓ [Z, j]) > 0
holds. The idea is that Alice and Bob randomly choose a basis and, after
the transmission, publicly restrict to the (possibly few) cases where they
happen to have chosen the same basis. Hence Eve knows j, and one has
I(X;Y ↓ [Z, j]) = (1/N)∑Nj=1 I(Xj ;Y j ↓ Z) . If the set of bases is large
enough, then for all {|z〉} there is a basis with positive intrinsic information,
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hence the mean is also positive. Clearly, this result is stronger if the set
of bases is small. Nothing is proven about the achievable size of such sets
of bases, but it is conceivable that max{dimHA,dimHB} bases are always
sufficient.
Corollary 3 Let Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE and ρAB = TrHE (PΨ). Then the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) ρAB is entangled,
(ii) for all generating sets {|z〉} of HE, there exist bases {|x〉} of HA and
{|y〉} of HB such that the distribution PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2 satisfies
I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0,
(ii) for all generating sets {|z〉} of HE, there exist bases {|x〉} of HA and
{|y〉} of HB such that the distribution PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2 satisfies
I(X;Y |Z) > 0.
A first consequence of the fact that Corollary 3 often holds with respect
to the standard bases (see below) is that it yields, at least in the binary case,
a criterion for I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 that is efficiently verifiable since it is based
on the positivity of the eigenvalues of a 4× 4 matrix (see also Example 5).
Previously, the quantity I(X;Y ↓Z) has been considered to be quite hard to
handle.
3.2 Examples I
The following examples illustrate the correspondence established in Sec-
tion 3.1. They show in particular that very often (Examples 1, 2, and 3),
but not always (Examples 6 and 7 in Appendix B), the direct connection
between entanglement and positive intrinsic information holds with respect
to the standard bases (i.e., the bases physicists use by commodity and intu-
ition).
Example 1. Let us consider the so-called 4-state protocol of [3]. The analy-
sis of the 6-state protocol [1] is analogous and leads to similar results [15].
We compare the possibility of quantum and classical key agreement given
the quantum state and the corresponding classical distribution, respectively,
arising from this protocol. The conclusion is, under the assumption of in-
coherent eavesdropping, that key agreement in one setting is possible if and
only if this is true also for the other.
After carrying out the 4-state protocol, and under the assumption of op-
timal eavesdropping (in terms of Shannon information), the resulting quan-
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tum state is [11]
Ψ =
√
F/2|0, 0〉⊗ξ00+
√
D/2|0, 1〉⊗ξ01+
√
D/2|1, 0〉⊗ξ10+
√
F/2|1, 1〉⊗ξ11 ∈ C2⊗C2⊗C4 ,
where D (the disturbance) is the probability that X 6= Y holds if X and
Y are the classical random variables of Alice and Bob, respectively, where
F = 1 − D (the fidelity), and where the ξij satisfy 〈ξ00|ξ11〉 = 〈ξ01|ξ10〉 =
1 − 2D and 〈ξii|ξij〉 = 0 for all i 6= j. Then the state ρAB is (in the basis
{| 00 〉,| 01 〉,| 10 〉,| 11 〉})
ρAB =
1
2


D 0 0 −D(1− 2D)
0 1−D −(1−D)(1− 2D) 0
0 −(1−D)(1 − 2D) 1−D 0
−D(1− 2D) 0 0 D

 ,
and its partial transpose
ρtAB =
1
2


D 0 0 −(1−D)(1 − 2D)
0 1−D −D(1− 2D) 0
0 −D(1− 2D) 1−D 0
−(1−D)(1− 2D) 0 0 D


has the eigenvalues (1/2)(D±(1−D)(1−2D)) and (1/2)((1−D)±D(1−2D)),
which are all non-negative (i.e., ρAB is separable) if
D ≥ 1− 1√
2
. (4)
From the classical viewpoint, the corresponding distributions (arising
from measuring the above quantum system in the standard bases) are as
follows. First, X and Y are both symmetric bits with Prob [X 6= Y ] = D.
Eve’s random variable Z = [Z1, Z2] is composed of 2 bits Z1 and Z2, where
Z1 = X ⊕ Y , i.e., Z1 tells Eve whether Bob received the qubit disturbed
(Z1 = 1) or not (Z1 = 0) (this is a consequence of the fact that the ξii and
ξij (i 6= j) states generate orthogonal sub-spaces), and where the probability
that Eve’s second bit indicates the correct value of Bob’s bit is Prob[Z2 =
Y ] = δ = (1 +
√
1− 〈ξ00|ξ11〉2)/2 = 1/2 +
√
D(1−D). We now prove that
for this distribution, the intrinsic information is zero if and only if
D
1−D ≥ 2
√
(1− δ)δ = 1− 2D (5)
holds. We show that if the condition (5) is satisfied, then I(X;Y ↓Z) = 0
holds. The inverse implication follows from the existence of a key-agreement
protocol in all other cases (see Example 1 (cont’d) in Section 3.5). If (5)
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holds, we can construct a random variable Z, that is generated by sending
Z over a channel characterized by PZ|Z , for which I(X;Y |Z) = 0 holds. We
can restrict ourselves to the case of equality in (5) because Eve can always
increase δ by adding noise.
Consider now the channel characterized by the following distribution
PZ|Z (whereZ = {u, v}): PZ|Z(u, [0, 0]) = PZ|Z(v, [0, 1]) = 1, PZ|Z(l, [1, 0]) =
PZ|Z(l, [1, 1]) = 1/2 for l ∈ {u, v}. (The channel PZ|Z is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 in Appendix A.) We show I(X;Y |Z) = EZ [I(X;Y |Z = z)] = 0, i.e.,
that I(X;Y |Z = u) = 0 and I(X;Y |Z = v) = 0 hold. By symmetry it is
sufficient to show the first equality. For aij := PXY Z(i, j, u), we get
a00 = (1−D)(1−δ)/2 , a11 = (1−D)δ/2 , a01 = a10 = (D(1−δ)/2+Dδ/2)/2 = D/4 .
From equality in (5) we conclude a00a11 = a01a10, which is equivalent to the
fact that X and Y are independent, given Z = u.
Finally, note that the conditions (4) and (5) are equivalent for D ∈
[0, 1/2]. This shows that the bounds of tolerable noise are indeed exactly
the same for the quantum and classical scenarios. ♦
Example 2. We consider the bound entangled state presented in [17]. This
example received quite a lot of attention by the quantum-information com-
munity because it was the first known example of bound entanglement (i.e.,
entanglement without the possibility of quantum key agreement). We show
that its classical counterpart seems to have similarly surprising properties.
Let 0 < a < 1 and
Ψ =
√
3a
8a+ 1
ψ⊗|0〉+
√
1
8a+ 1
φa⊗|1〉+
√
a
8a+ 1
(|122〉+|133〉+|214〉+|235〉+|326〉) ,
where ψ = (|11〉+|22〉+|33〉)/√3 and φa =
√
(1 + a)/(2) |31〉+
√
(1− a)/(2) |33〉.
It has been shown in [17] that the resulting state ρAB is entangled.
The corresponding classical distribution is as follows. The ranges are
X = Y = {1, 2, 3} and Z = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. We write (ijk) = PXY Z(i, j, k).
Then we have (110) = (220) = (330) = (122) = (133) = (214) = (235) =
(326) = 2a/(16a+2), (311) = (1+a)/(16a+2), and (331) = (1−a)/(16a+2).
We study the special case a = 1/2. Consider the following representation
of the resulting distribution (to be normalized). For instance, the entry
“(0) 1 , (1) 1/2” for X = Y = 3 means PXY Z(3, 3, 0) = 1/10 (normalized),
PXY Z(3, 3, 1) = 1/20, and PXY Z(3, 3, z) = 0 for all z 6∈ {0, 1}.
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X 1 2 3
Y (Z)
1 (0) 1 (4) 1 (1) 3/2
2 (2) 1 (0) 1 (6) 1
3 (3) 1 (5) 1 (0) 1
(1) 1/2
As we would expect, the intrinsic information is positive in this scenario.
This can be seen by contradiction as follows. Assume I(X;Y ↓Z) = 0. Hence
there exists a discrete channel, characterized by the conditional distribution
PZ|Z , such that I(X;Y |Z) = 0 holds. Let Z ⊆ N, and let PZ|Z(i, 0) =: ai,
PZ|Z(i, 1) =: xi, PZ|Z(i, 6) =: si. Then we must have ai, xi, si ∈ [0, 1] and∑
i ai =
∑
i xi =
∑
i si = 1. Using I(X;Y |Z) = 0, we obtain the following
distributions PXY |Z=i (to be normalized):
X 1 2 3
Y
1 ai
3aixi
2si
3xi
2
2 2aisi3xi ai si
3 2ai(ai+xi/2)3xi
ai(ai+xi/2)
si
ai +
xi
2
By comparing the (2, 3)-entries of the two tables above, we obtain
1 ≥
∑
i
ai(ai + xi/2)
si
. (6)
We now prove that (6) implies si ≡ ai (i.e., si = ai for all i) and xi ≡ 0.
Clearly, this does not lead to a solution and is hence a contradiction. For
instance, PXY |Z=i(1, 2) = 2aisi/(3xi) is not even defined in this case if
ai > 0.
It remains to show that (6) implies ai ≡ si and xi ≡ 0. We show that
whenever
∑
i ai =
∑
i si = 1 and ai 6≡ si, then
∑
i a
2
i /si > 1 . First, note
that
∑
i a
2
i /si =
∑
i ai = 1 for ai ≡ si. Let now si1 ≤ ai1 and si2 ≥ ai2 .
We show that a2i1/si1 + a
2
i2
/si2 < a
2
i1
/(si1 − ε) + a2i2/(si2 + ε) holds for every
ε > 0, which obviously implies the above statement. It is straightforward
to see that this is equivalent to a2i1si2(si2 + ε) > a
2
i2
si1(si1 − ε), and holds
because of a2i1si2(si2+ε) > a
2
i1
a2i2 and a
2
i2
si1(si1−ε) < a2i1a2i2 . This concludes
the proof of I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0. ♦
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As mentioned, the interesting point about Example 2 is that the quan-
tum state is bound entangled, and that also classical key agreement seems
impossible despite the fact that I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 holds. This is a contradic-
tion to a conjecture stated in [22]. The classical translation of the bound
entangled state leads to a classical distribution with very strange properties
as well! (See Example 2 (cont’d) in Section 3.4).
In Example 3, another bound entangled state (first proposed in [18]) is
discussed. The example is particularly nice because, depending on the choice
of the parameter α, the quantum state can be made separable, bound en-
tangled, and free entangled.
Example 3. We consider the following distribution (to be normalized). Let
2 ≤ α ≤ 5.
X 1 2 3
Y (Z)
1 (0) 2 (4) 5− α (3) α
2 (1) α (0) 2 (5) 5− α
3 (6) 5− α (2) α (0) 2
This distribution arises when measuring the following quantum state. Let
ψ := (1/
√
3) (|11〉 + |22〉 + |33〉). Then
Ψ =
√
2
7
ψ⊗|0〉+
√
a
21
(|12〉⊗|1〉+|23〉⊗|2〉+|31〉⊗|3〉)+
√
5− a
21
(|21〉⊗|4〉+|32〉⊗|5〉+|13〉⊗|6〉),
and ρAB =
2
7
Pψ +
a
21
(P12 + P23 + P31) +
5− a
21
(P21 + P32 + P13)
is separable if and only if α ∈ [2, 3], bound entangled for α ∈ (3, 4], and free
entangled if α ∈ (4, 5] [18] (see Figure 3 in Appendix A).
Let us consider the quantity I(X;Y ↓ Z). First of all, it is clear that
I(X;Y ↓Z) = 0 holds for α ∈ [2, 3]. The reason is that α ≥ 2 and 5− α ≥ 2
together imply that Eve can “mix” her symbol Z = 0 with the remaining
symbols in such a way that when given that Z takes the “mixed value,”
then XY is uniformly distributed; in particular, X and Y are independent.
Moreover, it can be shown in analogy to Example 2 that I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0
holds for α > 3. ♦
Examples 1, 2, and 3 suggest that the correspondence between separabil-
ity and entanglement on one side and vanishing and non-vanishing intrinsic
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information on the other always holds with respect to the standard bases or
even arbitrary bases. We show in Appendix B that this is not true in gen-
eral. More precisely, Examples 6 and 7 demonstrate how Eve as well as Alice
and Bob can perform bad measurements. Hence the parallelity between the
quantum and classical situation must be as it is stated in Theorems 1 and 2.
3.3 A Classical Measure for Quantum Entanglement
It is a challenging problem of theoretical quantum physics to find good
measures for entanglement [26]. Corollary 3 above suggests the following
measure, which is based on classical information theory.
Definition 1 Let for a quantum state ρAB
µ(ρAB) := min
{|z〉}
( max
{|x〉},{|y〉}
(I(X;Y ↓Z))) ,
where the minimum is taken over all Ψ =
∑
z
√
pzψz ⊗ |z〉 such that ρAB =
TrHE (PΨ) holds and over all bases {|z〉} of HE, the maximum is over all
bases {|x〉} ofHA and {|y〉} ofHB, and where PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2.
❣
Then µ has all the properties required from such a measure. If ρAB is
pure, i.e., ρAB = |ψAB〉〈ψAB |, then we have in the Schmidt basis (see for
example [24]) ψAB =
∑
j cj |xj , yj〉, and µ(ρAB) = −
∑
j |cj |2 log2(|cj |2) =
−Tr(ρAB log2 ρAB), as it should [26]. It is obvious that µ is convex, i.e.,
µ(λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) ≤ λµ(ρ1) + (1− λ)µ(ρ2).
Example 4 (based on Werner’s states). Let Ψ =
√
λψ(−)⊗|0〉+
√
(1− λ)/4 |001+
012+103+114〉, where ψ(−) = |10−01〉/√2, and ρAB = λPψ(−)+((1−λ)/4)1 .
It is well-known that ρAB is separable if and only if λ ≤ 1/3. Then the clas-
sical distribution is (010) = (100) = λ/2 and (001) = (012) = (103) =
(114) = (1− λ)/4.
If λ ≤ 1/3, then consider the channel PZ|Z(0, 0) = PZ|Z(2, 2) = PZ|Z(3, 3) =
1 , PZ|Z(0, 1) = PZ|Z(0, 4) = ξ , PZ|Z(1, 1) = PZ|Z(4, 4) = 1 − ξ , where
ξ = 2λ/(1 − λ) ≤ 1. Then µ(ρAB) = I(X;Y ↓Z) = I(X;Y |Z) = 0 holds, as
it should.
If λ > 1/3, then consider the (obviously optimal) channel PZ|Z(0, 0) =
PZ|Z(2, 2) = PZ|Z(3, 3) = PZ|Z(0, 1) = PZ|Z(0, 4) = 1. Then
µ(ρAB) = I(X ;Y↓Z) = I(X ;Y |Z) = PZ(0)·I(X ;Y |Z = 0) =
1 + λ
2
·(1−q log2 q−(1−q) log2(1−q)) ,
where q = 2λ/(1 + λ). ♦
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3.4 Classical Protocols and Quantum Privacy Amplification
It is a natural question whether the analogy between entanglement and
intrinsic information (see Section 3.1) carries over to the protocol level. The
examples given in Section 3.5 support this belief. A quite interesting and
surprising consequence would be that there exists a classical counterpart to
bound entanglement, namely intrinsic information that cannot be distilled
into a secret key by any classical protocol, if |X |+ |Y| > 5. In other words,
the conjecture in [22] that such information can always be distilled would
be proved for |X |+ |Y| ≤ 5, but disproved otherwise.
Conjecture 1 Let Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE and ρAB = TrHE (PΨ). Assume
that for all generating sets {|z〉} of HE there are bases {|x〉} and {|y〉} of
HA and HB, respectively, such that S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 holds for the distribu-
tion PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2. Then quantum privacy amplification is
possible with the state ρAB, i.e., ρAB is free entangled.
Conjecture 2 Let Ψ ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE and ρAB = TrHE (PΨ). Assume
that there exists a generating set {|z〉} of HE such that for all bases {|x〉}
and {|y〉} of HA and HB, respectively, S(X;Y ||Z) = 0 holds for the distri-
bution PXY Z(x, y, z) := |〈x, y, z|Ψ〉|2. Then quantum privacy amplification
is impossible with the state ρAB, i.e., ρAB is bound entangled or separable.
3.5 Examples II
The following examples support Conjectures 1 and 2 and illustrate their
consequences. We consider mainly the same distributions as in Section 3.2,
but this time under the aspect of the existence of classical and quantum
key-agreement protocols.
Example 1 (cont’d). We have shown in Section 3.2 that the resulting quan-
tum state is entangled if and only if the intrinsic information of the cor-
responding classical situation (with respect to the standard bases) is non-
zero. Here, we show that such a correspondence also holds on the pro-
tocol level. First of all, it is clear for the quantum state that QPA is
possible whenever the state is entangled because both HA and HB have
dimension two. On the other hand, the same is also true for the corre-
sponding classical situation, i.e., secret-key agreement is possible whenever
D/(1 −D) < 2
√
(1− δ)δ holds, i.e., if the intrinsic information is positive.
This is shown in Appendix C. There we describe the required protocol, more
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precisely, the advantage-distillation phase (called repeat-code protocol [20]),
in which Alice and Bob use their advantage given by the authenticity of the
public-discussion channel for generating new random variables for which the
legitimate partners have an advantage over Eve in terms of the (Shannon)
information about each other’s new random variables. For a further discus-
sion of this example, see also [15]. ♦
Example 2 (cont’d). The quantum state ρAB in this example is bound entan-
gled, meaning that the entanglement cannot be used for QPA. Interestingly,
but not surprisingly given the discussion above, the corresponding classical
distribution has the property that I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0, but nevertheless, all the
known classical advantage-distillation protocols [20], [22] fail for this distri-
bution! It seems that S(X;Y ||Z) = 0 holds (although it is not clear how this
fact could be rigorously proven, except by proving Conjecture 1 directly). ♦
Example 3 (cont’d). We have seen already that for 2 ≤ α ≤ 3, the quantum
state is separable and the corresponding classical distribution (with respect
to the standard bases) has vanishing intrinsic information. Moreover, it has
been shown that for the quantum situation, 3 < α ≤ 4 corresponds to bound
entanglement, whereas for α > 4, QPA is possible and allows for generating
a secret key [18]. We describe a classical protocol here which suggests that
the situation for the classical translation of the scenario is totally analogous:
The protocol allows classical key agreement exactly for α > 4. However, this
does not imply (although it appears very plausible) that no classical protocol
exists at all for the case α ≤ 4.
Let α > 4. We consider the following protocol for classical key agree-
ment. First of all, Alice and Bob both restrict their ranges to {1, 2} (i.e.,
publicly reject a realization unless X ∈ {1, 2} and Y ∈ {1, 2}). The resulting
distribution is as follows (to be normalized):
X 1 2
Y (Z)
1 (0) 2 (4) 5− α
2 (2) α (0) 2
Then, Alice and Bob both send their bits locally over channels PX |X and
PY |Y , respectively, such that the resulting bits X and Y are symmetric. The
channel PX|X [PY |Y ] sends X = 0 [Y = 1] to X = 1 [Y = 0] with probability
(2α− 5)/(2α+4), and leaves X [Y ] unchanged otherwise. The distribution
PXY Z is then
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X 1 2
Y (Z)
(0) 2 · 9
2α+4
(1) 5− α
1 (2) α · 9
2α+4
· 2α−5
2α+4
(2) α
(
2α−5
2α+4
)2
(0) 2 · 2 · 2α−5
2α+4
2 (2) α
(
9
2α+4
)2
(0) 2 · 9
2α+4
(2) α · 9
2α+4
· 2α−5
2α+4
It is not difficult to see that for α > 4, we have Prob [X = Y ] > 1/2 and
that, given that X = Y holds, Eve has no information at all about what
this bit is. Thus the repeat-code protocol described in Appendix C allows
for classical key agreement in this situation. For α ≤ 4 however, classical
key agreement, like quantum key agreement, seems impossible. The results
of Example 3 are illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix A. ♦
Example 5. The following distribution PXY Z , with binary X and Y , was
discussed and analyzed in [22] as an example of a simple distribution for
which the equivalence of I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 and S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 could not be
shown.
Assume that the random variables X and Y are distributed according
to PXY (0, 0) = PXY (1, 1) = (1 − α)/2, PXY (0, 1) = PXY (1, 0) = α/2, and
Z = [ZX , ZY ], where ZX and ZY are generated by sending X and Y over
two independent binary erasure channels with erasure probabilities δX and
δY , respectively.
If the conjectured parallels between classical and quantum protocols
hold, then I(X;Y ↓ Z) > 0 implies S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 because both X and
Y are binary. Moreover, due to the proven connection between intrinsic
information and entanglement and hence to the eigenvalues of the partial
transpose of the density matrix, the condition for I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 can be
explicitly given, and is very simple. This is surprising since the determina-
tion of I(X;Y ↓Z), as well as the advantage-distillation protocols for this
distribution, turned out to be quite complicated [22]. The condition under
which all the eigenvalues of the partial transpose of the density matrix of
the corresponding quantum state are non-negative is
(α− α2)
(
(1− δX)(1− δY )
δX
+ 2
)(
(1− δX)(1 − δY )
δY
+ 2
)
≥ 1 .
This bound is compatible with (but stronger than) all the bounds painfully
derived, by working purely in the classical information-theoretic world, in [22].
♦
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3.6 Bound Intrinsic Information
Examples 2 and 3 suggest that, in analogy to bound entanglement of a
quantum state, bound classical information exists, i.e., conditional intrinsic
information which cannot be used to generate a secret key in the classical
scenario. We give a formal definition of bound intrinsic information.
Definition 2 Let PXY Z be a distribution with I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0. Then if
S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 holds for this distribution, the intrinsic information be-
tween X and Y , given Z, is called free. Otherwise, if S(X;Y ||Z) = 0, the
information is called bound. ❣
Note that the existence of bound intrinsic information could not be
proven so far. However, all known examples of bound entanglement, com-
bined with all known advantage-distillation protocols, do not lead to a con-
tradiction to Conjecture 1! Clearly, it would be very interesting to rigor-
ously prove this conjecture because then, all pessimistic results known for
the quantum scenario would immediately carry over to the classical setting
(where such results appear to be much harder to prove).
Examples 2 and 3 also illustrate nicely what the nature of such bound
information is. Of course, I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 implies both I(X;Y ) > 0 and
I(X;Y |Z) > 0. However, if |X |+ |Y| > 5, it is possible that the dependence
between X and Y and the dependence between X and Y , given Z, are
“orthogonal.” By the latter we mean that for all fixed (deterministic or
probabilistic) functions f : X → {0, 1} and g : Y → {0, 1} for which the
correlation of f(X) and g(Y ) is positive, i.e.,
Pf(X)g(Y )(0, 0) · Pf(X)g(Y )(1, 1) > Pf(X)g(Y )(0, 1) · Pf(X)g(Y )(1, 0) ,
the correlation between the same binary random variables, given Z = z, is
negative (or “zero”) for all z ∈ Z, where Z is the random variable generated
by sending Z over Eve’s optimal channel PZ|Z .
A complete understanding of bound intrinsic information is of interest
also because it automatically leads to a better understanding of bound en-
tanglement in quantum information theory.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have considered the model of information-theoretic key agreement by
public discussion from correlated information. More precisely, we have com-
pared scenarios where the joint information is given by classical random
19
variables and by quantum states (e.g., after execution of a quantum pro-
tocol). We proved a close connection between such classical and quantum
information, namely between intrinsic information and entanglement. As
an application, the derived parallels lead to an efficiently verifiable criterion
for the fact that the intrinsic information vanishes. Previously, this quantity
was considered to be quite hard to handle.
Furthermore, we have presented examples providing evidence for the fact
that the close connections between classical and quantum information ex-
tend to the level of the protocols. As a consequence, the powerful tools and
statements on the existence or rather non-existence of quantum-privacy-
amplification protocols immediately carry over to the classical scenario,
where it is often unclear how to show that no protocol exists. In particular,
many examples (only some of which are presented above due to space limi-
tations) coming from measuring bound entangled states, and for which none
of the known classical secret-key agreement protocols is successful, strongly
suggest that bound entanglement has a classical counterpart: intrinsic in-
formation which cannot be distilled to a secret key. This stands in sharp
contrast to what was previously believed about classical key agreement. We
state as an open problem to rigorously prove Conjectures 1 and 2.
Finally, we have proposed a measure for entanglement, based on classical
information theory, with all the properties required for such a measure.
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Appendix A: Figures
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Figure 1: Secret-Key Agreement from Common Information
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Figure 2: The Channel PZ|Z in Example 1
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Appendix B: Measuring in “bad” Bases
In this appendix we show, by two examples, that the statements of Theo-
rems 1 and 2 do not always hold for the standard bases and, in particular,
not for arbitrary bases: Alice and Bob as well as Eve can perform bad mea-
surements and give away an initial advantage. Let us begin with an example
where measuring in the standard basis is a bad choice for Eve.
Example 6. Let us consider the quantum states
Ψ =
1√
5
(|00+01+10〉⊗|0〉+|00+11〉⊗|1〉) , ρAB = 3
5
P|00+01+10〉+
2
5
P|00+11〉 .
If Alice, Bob, and Eve measure in the standard bases, we get the classical
distribution (to be normalized)
X 0 1
Y (Z)
0 (0) 1 (0) 1
(1) 1 (1) 0
1 (0) 1 (0) 0
(1) 0 (1) 1
For this distribution, I(X;Y ↓Z) > 0 holds. Indeed, even S(X;Y ||Z) > 0
holds. This is not surprising since both X and Y are binary, and since the
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described parallels suggest that in this case, positive intrinsic information
implies that a secret-key agreement protocol exists.
The proof of S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 in this situation is analogous to the proof of
this fact in Example 3. The protocol consists of Alice and Bob independently
making their bits symmetric. Then the repeat-code protocol can be applied.
However, the partial-transpose condition shows that ρAB is separable.
This means that measuring in the standard basis is bad for Eve. Indeed, let
us rewrite Ψ and ρAB as
Ψ =
√
Λ |~m, ~m〉⊗|0˜〉+√1− Λ |−~m,−~m〉⊗|1˜〉 , ρAB = 5 +
√
5
10
P|~m,~m〉+
5−√5
10
P|−~m,−~m〉 ,
where Λ = (5 +
√
5)/10, |~m, ~m〉 = |~m〉 ⊗ |~m〉, | ± ~m〉 = √(1± η)/2 |0〉 ±√
(1∓ η)/2 |1〉, and η = 1/√5.
In this representation, ρAB is obviously separable. It also means that
Eve’s optimal measurement basis is
|0˜〉 =
√
Λ |0〉 − 1√
5Λ
|1〉 , |1˜〉 = −
√
1− Λ |0〉 − 1√
5(1 − Λ) |1〉 .
Then, I(X;Y ↓Z) = 0 holds for the resulting classical distribution. ♦
Not surprisingly, there also exist examples of distributions for which mea-
suring in the standard bases is bad for Alice and Bob. These states are
entangled, but I(X;Y ↓Z) = 0 holds.
Example 7. Let the following classical distribution be given:
X 0 1
Y (Z)
0 (0) 0.0082 (0) 0.0219
(1) 0.0006 (1) 0.0202
1 (0) 0.0729 (0) 0.3928
(1) 0.0905 (1) 0.3889204545
Because of
(0.0082+0.0006)·(0.03928+0.3889204545) = (0.0219+0.0202)·(0.0729+0.0905)
we have I(X;Y ) = 0, thus I(X;Y ↓ Z) = 0. On the other hand, the
corresponding quantum state, for which the above distribution results by
measuring in the standard bases, can be shown to be entangled. ♦
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Appendix C: A Protocol for Advantage Distillation
The following protocol for classical advantage distillation is called repeat-
code protocol and was first proposed in [20]. Note that there exist more
efficient protocols in terms of the amount of extractable secret key. However,
since we only want to prove qualitative possibility results, it is sufficient to
look at this simpler protocol. Assume the scenario of Example 1.
Let N > 0 be an even integer, and let Alice choose a random bit C and
send the block
XN ⊕ CN := [X1 ⊕C,X2 ⊕ C, . . . ,XN ⊕ C]
over the classical channel. Here, XN stands for the block [X1,X2, . . . ,XN ] of
N consecutive realizations of the random variable X, whereas CN stands for
the N -bit block [C,C, . . . , C]. Bob then computes [(C ⊕X1)⊕ Y1, . . . , (C ⊕
XN ) ⊕ YN ] and (publicly) accepts exactly if this block is equal to either
[0, 0, . . . , 0] or [1, 1, . . . , 1]. In other words, Alice and Bob make use of
a repeat code of length N with the only two codewords [0, 0, . . . , 0] and
[1, 1, . . . , 1].
Bob’s conditional error probability βN when guessing the bit sent by
Alice, given that he accepts, is
βN =
1
pa,N
·DN ≤
(
D
1−D
)N
,
where pa,N = D
N+(1−D)N is the probability that Bob accepts the received
block. It is obvious that Eve’s optimal strategy for guessing C is to compute
the block [(C⊕X1)⊕Z1, . . . , (C⊕XN )⊕ZN ] and guess C as 0 if at least half
of the bits in this block are 0, and as 1 otherwise. Given that Bob correctly
accepts, Eve’s error probability when guessing the bit C with the optimal
strategy is lower bounded by 1/2 times the probability that she decodes to
a block with N/2 bits 0 and the same number of 1’s. Hence we get that
γN ≥ 1
2
(
N
N/2
)
(1 − δ)N/2δN/2 ≥ K√
N
·
(
2
√
(1− δ)δ
)N
holds for some constant K and for sufficiently large N by using Stirling’s
formula. Note that Eve’s error probability given that Bob accepts is asymp-
totically equal to her error probability given that Bob correctly accepts be-
cause Bob accepts erroneously only with asymptotically vanishing probabil-
ity, given that he accepts.
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Although it is not the adversary’s ultimate goal to guess the bits C sent
by Alice, it has been shown that the fact that βN decreases exponentially
faster than γN implies that for sufficiently large N , Bob has more (Shannon)
information about the bit C than Eve (see for example [22]). Hence Alice
and Bob have managed to generate new random variables with the property
that Bob obtains more information about Alice’s random bit than Eve has.
Thus S(X;Y ||Z) > 0 holds.
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